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I. INTRODUCTION
Every state has some type of legislation that opens "meetings" of
"public bodies" to public scrutiny.' However, the full scope of these
statutes has not been determined. Although the public has a right to
witness the operations of its government, these statutes have not yet
been tested to determine whether this right of access can be satisfied
by allowing the media to represent the public's interest. This Article
will address public access and press representation relative to a Ne-
braska Unicameral rule that provides that executive sessions of legis-
lative committees may be closed to the general public but open to
members of the news media.2
Each year the Nebraska Legislature enacts rules by which its ses-
sions are governed.3 The Rules of the Nebraska Unicameral provide
for the appointment of committees that have the power "to hold such
1. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-14-2 (1982); ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1980); ARuz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.01 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11120 (Deering 1982); COLo. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402 (1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10,004 (1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (Supp. 1982);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-2340 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch
102, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 5 14-1.5-1 (Burns 1976);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.1 (West Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4317 (1977);
KY. REV. STAT. § 61.805 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:4-5 (West 1984); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 403 (1979); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 76A § 7 (1979);
MASs. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 30A, § 11AI/2 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN.
§ 15.263 (Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 25-41-1 (Supp. 1984); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.010 (Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-3-203 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (Cum. Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 241.020 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2 (Supp. 1983); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 10:4-6 (Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1.1 (1978); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW
§ 95-106 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 44-04-19 (1973); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 301 (West Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.630 (1983); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1 (1977);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-60 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1983); S.D. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 1-25-
1 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-101 -(1980); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6252.17 (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-1 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
1 § 312 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 2.1-343 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 42-30-
010 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 19-81 (Supp. 1984);
Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-401 (1977).
2. See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Rules of the Neb. Unicameral, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985). See also
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions
*.. as it deems advisable."4 Bills introduced during a legislative ses-
sion are referred to the appropriate committee for public hearing and
consideration.5 Each standing committee must hold a public hearing
before taking final action on a bill.6 After the public hearing, the com-
mittee may call an executive session pursuant to Nebraska Unicam-
eral Rule 3, section 15, in order to review the proposed legislation.7
Executive sessions "are not electronically recorded and transcribed,
unless the committee so provides .... Executive sessions shall be
open to members of the news media who may report on action taken
and on all discussions in executive sessions."
8
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NEBRASKA, NEBRASKA STATE GOVERNMENT 16-24
(4th ed. 1976).
4. Rules of the Neb. Unicameral, 89th Leg., 1st Sess., Rule 3, § 1 at 13 (1985) [herein-
after cited as RNU].
5. R. MIEWALD, NEBRASKA GOVERNMENT AND POLITIcs 65 (1984). Note that certain
technical revisor's bills may be placed on general file immediately. Id See also
RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3, §§ 12, 16 at 18-19 (1985).
6. RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3, § 13 at 19: "Before taking final action on a bill or
resolution, a committee shall hold a public hearing thereon and shall give at least
seven calendar days' notice, after the bill shall have been printed, by publication
in the Legislative Journal." See also R. MIEWALD, supra note 5, at 66.
7. RNU, supra note 4; R. MIEWALD, supra note 5, at 66.
8. RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3, § 15 at 19 (1985). The rule was first adopted in this
form in 1981. Executive sessions were initially opened by rule to members of the
news media in 1953: "Reporters of regularly accredited newspapers, press as-
sociations, and radio and television stations shall be admitted to executive ses-
sions of the standing committees but shall respect as confidential discussions by
members of the committee." Rules of the Neb. Unicameral, 65th Leg., Rule 6,
§ 11 at 12 (1953). An attempt was made that year to allow representatives of the
media to report on the vote taken by committee members on pending legislation.
The motion failed on the floor by 19 votes. The Rule was next changed in 1960 to
read: "Members and reporters of regularly accredited newspapers, press associa-
tions, and radio and television stations shall be admitted to executive sessions of
the standing committees, and such reporters and the members of such commit-
tees shall respect as confidential the discussions and voting of the other members
of any standing committee." This change was presumably made to prevent com-
mittee members from disclosing secret discussions and voting that took place in
executive sessions. Rules of the Neb. Unicameral, 70th Leg., Neb. Leg. J. XXI
(1960).
In 1973, the Legislature voted to change the rule to allow the media to report
on any vote taken in an executive session. Rules of the Neb. Unicameral, 83d
Leg., 1st Sess., Rule 3, § 7 at 12 (1973). Finally, the rule was changed to its present
form in 1981. Telephone interview with Chris Peterson, Researcher for Neb. Leg.
Research Office (Apr. 5, 1984).
There is no reason given for dropping the words "regularly accredited" from
the description of news media. The conclusion may be drawn, however, that such
a description was arbitrary in that it excluded individuals beyond so-called "legiti-
mate" news gatherers. It is unclear who qualifies as "members of the news me-
dia" today. However, a booklet compiled by the Clerk of the Legislature lists
specific members of the news press, radio, and television media, and their em-
ployers. Included in the list is the Daily Nebraskan. The Neb. Unicameral, 88th
[Vol. 64:282
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It is currently the practice of the Nebraska Legislature to hold ex-
ecutive sessions frequently during the initial stages of a legislative ses-
sion and after public hearings on legislation in order to discuss the
merits of a particular bill and to vote on whether it should be ad-
vanced to general file.9 The importance of closing a meeting at this
time is obvious. The committee can refuse to advance a particular bill,
or the bill can be extensively changed in executive session.10 Thus,
the public is refused access to the part of the legislative process that
can make or break a bill.
Because the public is excluded from these legislative meetings, in
which matters of public interest are discussed and acted upon, Rule 3,
section 15 violates the Nebraska Public Meetings Law."' The public's
right to attend meetings of public bodies was codified by the Legisla-
ture, and the Legislature must abide by its own mandate. Press repre-
sentation of the public interest is insufficient, under the statute, to
meet the test of an open meeting.
Beyond violating state statute, closing legislative executive sessions
to the general public violates the first and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution. The first amendment provides for the
right of public access to important government functions.12 This right
of access promotes the stability of the government through continued
support and loyalty to the system-achieved only if the government
operates in an open forum.'3 When the public is barred from legisla-
tive executive sessions, this constitutional right of access is violated.
Furthermore, freedom of speech is a fundamental right that cannot
Leg., 2d Sess. Roster of Membership, Committees, Officers and Employees 49-51,
complied by P. O'Donnell, Clerk of the Legislature (1984).
9. See R. MIEWALD, supra note 5, at 66. Miewald notes that the current procedure is
that executive sessions willfollow public hearings.
10. See RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3 § 12 at 18-19.
11. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to -1414 (Curn. Supp. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819, 827-29 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (public access protects the public from abridgment of right
to information on government operations); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
867 (1981) (focusing on the first amendment's role in affording the public access
to dissemination of information and ideas); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct.,
457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (major purpose of first amendment is to protect free dis-
cussion of government affairs); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion) (first amendment assures free communication
on matters of government functioning); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (first amendment concerns encompass re-
ceipt of information as well as rights of free expression).
13. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574-76 (1980) (expressly
guaranteed freedoms of the first amendment "share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of gov-
erinent"). Cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("A major purpose of
[the first] amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.").
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be abridged except by compelling governmental interests.14 By ex-
tending the opportunity to view executive sessions to members of the
news media only, the Nebraska Legislature has violated the first
amendment right to receive information15 and the fourteenth amend-
ment right of equal protection.16 There is no compelling government
reason to exclude the public from, yet grant the news media access to,
executive sessions.17 When the issue is whether the public may listen
to debate on matters encompassing pending legislation, the public's
need for information outweighs any inconvenience suffered by legisla-
tive committees.
Finally, the Constitution does not provide greater rights under the
first amendment for members of the news media than for members of
the general public.' 8 Freedom of the press guarantees that all individ-
uals may disseminate information freely and without government in-
terference. The news media is not a special category designated to
receive special treatment.19 There is no constitutional right enabling
the news media to act as representatives of the public and to filter
important information before it reaches the public. Access cannot be
restricted to only those who have qualified for the label "news me-
dia."2 0 If the door is opened at all, it must be opened completely.
II. RULE 3, SECTION 15 OF THE RULES OF THE NEBRASKA
UNICAMERAL VIOLATES THE STATE'S OPEN
MEETINGS LAW
In 1975, Nebraska strengthened its Public Meetings Law,21 through
14. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (although public distribution
of obscene materials disallowed, mere possession doesn't rise to level of compel-
ling interest); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (state power to regulate
conduct in and around polling places supported as compelling interest); Lovell v.
Griffen, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (licensing and censorship of the press are not
compelling state interests); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925) (distur-
bances of the peace; subversion of government as compelling interests).
15. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1981) (first amendment neces-
sarily protects right to receive information); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (dissemination can not
be suppressed merely for fear of the information's effect upon recipients).
16. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (right to interstate travel a
fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964) (right of privacy
is a fundamental right); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (the right
of procreation "fundamental" and entitled to equal protection). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAw §§ 16-6 to -12 (1978).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 165-91.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 185-91. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977); First Am. Dev. Corp. v. Daytona Beach
News-Journal Corp., 196 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1966).
20. See supra note 8.
21. "LB 325 in its amended form insures that all meeting [sic] of public bodies be
[Vol. 64:282
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the adoption of LB 325, which was designed to yield greater public
access to the meetings of public bodies in Nebraska.22 The statute23
provides that a meeting24 of a public body may not be closed25 unless it
"is clearly necessary for the protection of the public interest or for the
prevention of needless injury to the reputation of an individual and
that individual has not requested a public meeting."26
Legislative Rule 3, section 15, governing the current practice of the
Nebraska Legislature, appears to violate the clear language of the
open to the public, except when protection of the public interest clearly calls for a
closed meeting concerning specific matters." Hearings on LB 325 Before the
Comm. on Gov'% Military and Veteran Affairs, 84th Leg. 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on LB 325].
22. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to -1414 (Cum. Supp. 1984). This statute was
strengthened in 1983 by the passage of LB 43. The purpose of the change was to
clarify the statute's "difficulties and plug loopholes, real or imagined, to make the
law even more effective." Hearings on LB 43 Before the Comm for Gov't Mili-
tary and Veteran Affairs, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (1983) (Statement of Intent) (state-
ment of Sen. Hoagland) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on LB 43].
23. In relevant part, the statute provides: "Every meeting of the public body shall be
open to the public in order that citizens may exercise their democratic privilege
of attending and speaking at meetings of public bodies, except as otherwise pro-
vided in the Constitution of the State of Nebraska .... NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
1408 (1979) (emphasis added).
24. The statute provides that:
As used in sections ... 84-1408 to -1414, . unless the context other-
wise requires:
(1) Public body shall mean... (c) all independent boards, commis-
sions, bureaus, committees, councils, subunits, Certificate of Need appeal
panels, or any other bodies, now or hereafter created by Constitution,
statute, or otherwise pursuant to law...
(2) Meeting shall mean all regular, special or called meetings, formal
or informal of any public body for the purpose of... discussion ofpub-
lic business ... or the taking of any action of the public body.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1409 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
25. The word "closed" is not defined in the Open Meetings statute. "Open," however,
means a meeting "shall be open to the public." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (Cum.
Supp. 1984) (emphasis added). Thus, closed must mean closed to the public. The
issue then becomes whether the press is part of the public for purposes of the
Open Meetings Law. Since there is no indication of a contrary intent in the stat-
ute or legislative history, and because the practice around the state has been to
exclude both, it can be assumed that the Legislature meant to include members
of the news media in its definition of "public." See, e.g., Hearings on LB 43, supra
note 22, at 48 (1983) ("[P]olitical sub-divisions have something that the Unicam-
eral doesn't have. Right now, you don't have to let the press in your closed ses-
sions.") (statement of Sen. Vickers).
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cum. Supp. 1984). See Grein v. Board of Educ., 216
Neb. 158, 164-65, 343 N.W.2d 718, 723 (1984) (the public meetings law is broadly
interpreted and liberally construed to obtain the objective of openness in favor of
the public, and provisions permitting closed sessions must be narrowly and
strictly construed); Simonds v. Board of Examiners, 213 Neb. 259, 266, 329 N.W.2d
92, 97 (1983) ("consideration of Simond's case in closed executive session appar-
ently was contrary to § 84-1410, since there was no showing of necessity or the
reasons enumerated in (1)(a), (b), or (c)").
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Open Meetings Law. The Legislature is allowed to call an executive
session to exclude the public at any time for any purpose.27 There are
no guidelines provided in the rule for calling an executive session.
The doors of an executive session are automatically closed to the pub-
lic and the meeting need not be reconvened in public before formal
action is taken.28 Thus, the public cannot see the workings of their
elected officials, and generally has only limited access to information
from the executive session.
To reach the conclusion that Rule 3, section 15 violates the state's
Open Meetings Law, two questions must be answered. First, it must
be determined whether the law applies to meetings of Legislative
committees. Second, it must be determined whether any justification
for closing executive sessions satisfies the requirements to close a
meeting of a public body as set forth in section 84-1410.
A. Section 84-1408 of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law Applies to the
Legislature
Section 84-1408 of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law expressly
provides that "[elvery meeting of a public body shall be open to the
public ... "29 Public bodies are "committees ... or any other bod-
ies, now or hereafter created by Constitution, statute, or otherwise
pursuant to law."30 A meeting of a public body takes place when that
body convenes to "discuss public business ... or [take] any action of
the public body."31 From the express statutory language, the Legisla-
ture and its committees are public bodies for purposes of the Open
Meetings Law.
Legislative committees are constitutionally created.32 The purpose
of legislative committees is to investigate and to "present to the Legis-
lature for its consideration any final reports and recommendations for
action. . . -33 If a committee decides to indefinitely postpone a bill,
the legislation will remain in committee and not be considered on the
floor.34 A decision to report a bill unfavorably to the full Legislature,
27. RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3, § 15 at 19.
28. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410
(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (1981) (emphasis added).
30. Id. The statute also refers to three other sections that may affect the scope of the
Open Meetings Law. Id. §§ 79-327 (1981) (laws governing the State Board of Edu-
cation); id. §§ 84-1408 to -1414 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (Public Meetings Law); id.
§§ 85-104 (1981) (laws governing the Board of Regents). These exceptions do not
exempt the Legislature from the force of the Open Meetings Law.
31. Id. § 84-1409(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
32. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 9.
33. RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3, § 1 at 13.
34. See R. MIEWALD, supra note 5, at 70.
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which occurs nearly 40 percent of the time,35 must be reversed by
thirty votes.3 6 This gives the committee considerable power. Much of
the important discussion that determines whether a bill will be ad-
vanced or revised, under Rule 3, section 15, is kept from the public.37
The general public undoubtedly has an interest in these proceedings
and, therefore, pursuant to section 84-1408, executive sessions "may
not be conducted in secret."3 8
The Open Meetings Statute provides for only three exceptions to
the open public meetings rule: when otherwise provided for (1) in the
Nebraska Constitution, (2) by federal statutes, or (3) by other Ne-
braska law.39 None of these exceptions expressly exempt the Legisla-
ture or its Standing Committees from the force of the Open Meetings
Law. The Nebraska Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he doors
of the Legislature and of the Committees of the Whole, shall be open,
unless when the business shall be such as ought to be kept secret." 40
In addition, "the Legislature shall determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings ... ."43 Although this section permits the Legislature to es-
tablish boundaries for conduct and order at its meetings, the section
operates in conjunction with Article III, section 11, which requires
open meetings.42 These instructions do not conflict with the Open
Meetings Statute. Section 84-1410 allows any public body to close a
session "by the affirmative vote of a majority ... if a closed session is
clearly necessary for the protection of the public interest or for the
prevention of needless injury to the reputation of an individual
.... ,,43 A legislative committee may govern its proceedings under
the rules adopted by the Legislature, pursuant to the Open Meetings
Law and the Nebraska Constitution, but cannot close a meeting to the
public unless "necessary" or unless it "ought to be kept secret." Thus,
a mandatory closure rule is overbroad and violative of the Open Meet-
ings Law.
Since there are no federal laws governing the conduct of state leg-
islatures, the second exemption under section 84-1408 does not apply.
The third exception, any exclusion expressly provided in the Public
35. Id
36. Id. Because committees are fairly small in size and because of the power a com-
mittee recommendation has on the floor, senators may concentrate more time
and energy on their committee assignments than on general legislative activity.
Id
37. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
38. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410 (1981). See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (1981). See supra note 30.
40. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11.
41. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10.
42. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11.
43. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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Meetings Law,44 is also inapplicable. The statute specifically exempts
from its definition of any "public body" judicial proceedings, and the
meetings of those subcommittees that have no authority to act, make
policy, or hold hearings.45 The statute does not exclude legislative
committee proceedings. Thus, the Legislature is not exempt from the
statutory mandate- that meetings of public bodies must be open to
the public.
1. Meetings of the Legislature Are Covered by the Clear
Language of the Statute and by the Legislative
History
Elementary rules of statutory construction provide that unless the
language of a statute is ambiguous, no recourse to interpretation from
legislative history is necessary.46 The plain words of the statute, to-
gether with its underlying purpose, are the sources from which a stat-
ute should be construed.47 Whether the Legislature, in passing either
the Open Meetings Law or its amendments, intended to exclude itself
from the scope of the statute is irrelevant. The language of the statute
is unambiguous.48 Moreover, the Legislature forthrightly announced
its purpose: the formation of public policy is the business of the public
and may not be conducted in secret.49 The statutory language can
clearly be read to include meetings of the Legislature.5 0
However, even if the language of the Open Meetings Law were
deemed to be ambiguous, the legislative history of the statute does not
justify the conclusion that the Legislature is exempt from the statute's
application.51 The expressed purpose of the statute remained un-
changed from that declared during the 1975 debate. Senator Hoag-
land, who sponsored LB 43 (enacted to strengthen the 1975 Open
44. Id. § 84-1408 (1981).
45. Id. § 84-1409(1)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
46. Hill v. City of Lincoln, 213 Neb. 517, 521, 330 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1983) (no interpre-
tation needed when words of statute are plain and unambiguous); Freese v. Doug-
las County, 210 Neb. 521, 526, 315 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1982) (primary rule of
construction is that intention of legislature is to be found in ordinary meaning of
words of a statute).
47. McMartin Indus. v. Vinal, 301 F. Supp. 749,755 (D. Neb.), affd, 441 F.2d 1274 (8th
Cir. 1969).
48. See Grien v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 164-65, 343 N.W.2d 718, 723 (1984) (pub-
lic meetings laws are to be broadly interpreted and liberally construed in favor of
openness to the public; provisions and exemptions permitting closed meeting ses-
sions must be narrowly and strictly construed). See also infra text accompanying
note 59.
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (1981). See also Hearings on LB 325, supra note 21, at 2
(purpose is to give "the public access to the affairs of government") (statement of
Sen. Anderson, sponsor).
50. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 64:282
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Meetings Law), expressed the philosophy behind the law in a public
committee hearing on the bill:
LB 325 was a major step forward in opening up meetings of the Legislature
and political subdivisions around this State to attendance by members of the
public.... LB 325 was a major philosophical step forward because this
stands for the proposition that public bodies that conduct the public business
in the State of Nebraska and that spend public funds, tax funds, ought to be
open to the public except under very limited circumstances. The open meet-
ings law stands for the basic philosophy that when public bodies conduct their
business, they ought to conduct their business openly unless there is a compel-
ling need, unless it's clearly necessary for the protection of the public interest
that those meetings be closed.5 2
It is clear from debate on the bill that the purpose of the statute
was to protect the public interest. This purpose must apply to meet-
ings of the Legislature. If it does not, we are forced to the absurd con-
clusion that the Legislature either does not serve the public interest,
or is not part of the government.
When Nebraska senators discussed whether they fell within the
scope of the open meetings statute, it was suggested that the state con-
stitution exempted the Legislature. This philosophy was explained at
the floor debate:
I know this question has come up and there is a specific recognition of the
Legislature's right to open or close its meeting in the Constitution. I think the
Constitution says something to the effect that the meetings in the Legislature
shall be open except such meetings shall be secret, or something like that.
Anyway, in the opening section 1 of the act, it recognizes the Constitution and
the Constitution prevails in this case. This particular act does not apply to the
Legislature because the Constitution overrides....53
With this explanation, the bill was adopted: thirty-one senators voted
in favor, one against, and seventeen did not vote.5 4
As previously discussed, the Nebraska Constitution does not ex-
pressly override the Open Meetings Law.55 Moreover, the 1975 discus-
sion generated no justification as to why executive sessions of
legislative committees "ought to be kept secret." During the 1983
hearings, Senator Nichol did argue public exclusion for convenience
sake: "I would suggest that we continue to do it the way it is, allowing
the news media in but not the public inasmuch as the news media
translates that to the public anyway, would just provide a little less
interruption, perhaps, from the public."56 Senator Hoagland added
52. Hearings on LB 43, supra note 22, at 2 (1983) (emphasis added).
53. Floor debate on LB 325, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. 4611 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Anderson).
54. Id. at 4621.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
56. Hearings on LB 43, supra note 22, at 4 (statement of Sen. Nichol). Sen. Nichol
was responding to Sen. Higgins' question of whether there was any reason not to
allow the public access, since media were already allowed in executive sessions.
Sen. Hoagland also replied that such an expansion would be something to be con-
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that "the open meetings law has been interpreted by the Attorney
General as not applying to the Legislature." 57 There was no discus-
sion of whether the rule should include the Legislature, only the as-
sumption that it did not.58
Shortly after the original Open Meetings Law was passed, Senator
Warner requested an Attorney General's opinion on whether the stat-
ute applied to the Legislature. The opinion concluded not only that
the Legislature is a public body that holds statutorily-defined "meet-
ings," but that the Constitution does not prohibit application of the
statute to the Legislature:
[T]he Constitution of the State of Nebraska does not make any provisions that
are contrary to or in conflict with the Open Meetings Law and, in fact, the
Constitution and this act appear to complement one another .... Therefore,
the clear and unambiguous language of the act ... must be said to apply to
the Legislature and its various committees.5 9
Obviously, Senator Hoagland's later assertion-that the Attorney
General concluded the Constitution exempted the Legislature from
the Open Meetings Law-was mistaken.60 If senators believed, when
they enacted the law, that the Legislature need not be expressly ex-
cluded, such reliance was misplaced. There is insufficient evidence
that the Legislature intended to exclude its meetings from the law;
rather, the issue was never before the Legislature.63
It should also be noted that there was concern in the committee
hearings that the Open Meetings Law should apply equally to the pub-
lic and the news media. The hearings conclude unequivocally that the
statute was drafted for the benefit of both the public and the news
media.62 In fact, testimony on behalf of the news media stated that
press members "do not wish to be separated in the degree of [their]
rights to attend any public meeting because [they] carry a press card of
some kind .... [The statute applies] to all of the public."63
sidered, but since that issue was beyond the scope of LB 43, he would like more
time to think about it. Id
57. Id. at 3. With these explanations given to the Committee, the issue of the stat-
ute's application to the Legislature was dropped.
58. The statute was advanced to general file during executive session. The issue was
not discussed during floor debate, and the bill was adopted on Apr. 8, 1983, 34 to
10, with 5 senators not voting. Floor debate on LB 43, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. 2291
(1983).
59. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 118, at 159 (1975) (emphasis added).
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61. See supra text acccompanying notes 56-58. See also infra note 77.
62. See Hearings on LB 43, supra note 22, at 15-17, 21-23.
63. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Sen. Chambers expressed concern that LB 43 was
really a bill for the news media and not a bill for open meetings:
Sen. Chambers: Now if we're talking about an open meetings law, we
can be talking about the media, the public body, or the evil. Now to
which one of those groups, the right of which one of those groups would
this law run?
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In summary, the express and unambiguous language of the Open
Meetings Law includes the Legislature. Even though the statute was
enacted under the mistaken assumption that the Legislature was ex-
empt because of Constitutional prohibitions, the Legislature cannot be
immune from the scope of the law simply because of a misplaced be-
lief in an incorrect constitutional argument. The statutory language
clearly covers legislative activity. Therefore, the Legislature must
either amend the statute in order to expressly exclude executive ses-
sions from the scope of the law, or it must abide by the statute's
mandate.
B. Closing Executive Sessions to the Public Does Not Satisfy the
Statutory Requirements to Close a Meeting
Pursuant to section 84-1410, a public body may hold a closed meet-
ing when necessary to protect the public interest or to protect an indi-
vidual's reputation. If the business of a legislative executive session
falls under either catagory, the committee may close the session by a
majority vote.6 4 An executive session is generally called to discuss the
Alan Peterson: This law runs to the rights of every citizen, good, bad,
malicious, evil, vindictive, whether he works for a newspaper or a TV
station or a radio station or not .... It goes to all of the public .... It's
for both public and news media .... [A]s you know, the theory is that
the news media will help inform the rest of the public ... if they do
their job well.
Sen. Chambers: You and I are more sophisticated. We know that the
media often don't inform the public at all. So we won't even talk about
that. What I'm trying to get to is (inaudible). Let's take it a step back.
Let's go even back, let's go for freedom of the press. Does that right
exist and is it constitutionally guaranteed to protect the media or to ben-
efit the public?
Aian Peterson: The cases seem to say and we don't disagree with it, that
the presses' and news media's rights go no further than the rest of the
public.
Id. (emphasis added).
Senator Higgins expressed her concern for this problem:
Last week, the Nebraska Broadcasters Association magazine reported an
executive meeting of the Committtee on Committees and in it they
quoted me extensively ... But the other Senator and what he said was
never quoted, what he said to me or about me. Now this is what I'm
making a point, the executive session the news media is allowed to re-
port to the public exactly what goes on. But in this instance, the only
thing they really reported was what Senator Higgins said. Do you think
that the public was really well informed about that executive session.
You should see the clandestine things we do there.
Id. at 21-22. See also infra note 77.
64. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410 (1). The section provides that:
Closed sessions may be held for, but shall not be limited to, such reasons
as: (a) Strategy sessions with respect to collective bargaining, real estate
purchases, or litigation; (b) Discussion regarding deployment of security
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merits of proposed legislation and to vote on advancement of a bill. It
is difficult to imagine how conducting such discussions behind closed
doors, so that members of the public cannot hear debate on the issue,
can protect the public interest.
Several reasons are advanced for this policy, none of which justify
public exclusion. For example, poor public attendance at executive
sessions is one reason for closing executive sessions to the public.
Such sessions are held during the daytime, and unless an issue is con-
troversial, attendance at public hearings is low. Besides, the media
may attend and report on committee activity, and this should be suffi-
cient to safeguard the public interest. However, this proposition begs
the question. The purpose of the Open Meetings Law is to provide
access to information regarding public matters. Citizens have a right
to hold elected servants accountable for their actions and to observe
the workings of a system that, in essence, they have set up to control
their lives. To suggest that public meetings should be open for the
benefit of public scrutiny, but closed because the public will not attend
is absurd.
Furthermore, it is indefensible under present statutory language to
allow the news media attendance at executive sessions on the theory
that they sufficiently represent the public. There is no provision in
the statute providing that meetings are open except when the public
body decides that members of the news media are better suited to act
as public representatives than are members of the public at large.
Although the statute does not define "public," it is understood that the
term encompasses both the general public and the media.65 Thus, if a
meeting is closed, it must be closed completely, or it must be open to
the entire public.
A second reason proffered for excluding the public from executive
sessions may be to effectively exclude lobbyists.6 6 Lobbyists have be-
come very influential in controlling legislators' votes.67 Removing
lobbyists from meetings in which bills are being discussed may relieve
pressure from senators who wish to express an opinion on a bill, but
who do not want to do so in front of lobbyists. Angering a particular
lobby may mean fewer campaign dollars for the legislator's next elec-
tion. Closed executive sessions allow senators to speak free from this
personnel or devices; or (c) Investigative proceedings regarding allega-
tions of criminal misconduct. Nothing in this section shall permit a
closed meeting for discussion of the appointment or election of a new
member to the public body.
Note that closing to protect public interest and opening only enough to safeguard
public interest are not the same issue.
65. See supra note 25.
66. Interview with Sen. Beutler (Mar. 27, 1984).
67. See generally D. HALL, COOPERATIVE LOBBYING-THE POWER OF PRESSURE
(1969).
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concern. The argument is weak, however, because it is overbroad, and
because it does not accomplish its purpose.
If legislators are uncomfortable with lobby pressures, only lobby-
ists should be excluded from executive sessions, and members of the
general public allowed to attend. Closing an executive session to the
entire public "throws the baby out with the bathwater." Further-
more, lobbyists have access to exactly the information that legislators
are trying to withhold. Lobbyists, because they must be familiar with
all phases of the legislative process, generally know who will vote in
favor of or in opposition to any bill before a vote is taken in executive
session. The final vote of the committee is also published for the pub-
lic-and for the lobbyists-to review. 68 Thus, closing a session does
not prevent lobby presures. The rule merely makes it more conve-
nient for members of the Legislature to conduct their business.69
A third reason advanced for closing executive sessions is that votes
at open meetings may be different than those made at closed ses-
sions.70 Public accountability may inhibit a legislator from speaking
publicly in opposition to, or in favor of, a measure. Because the public
may not understand sufficiently all the workings of the Legislature, or
may take a statement out of context or misconstrue the gist of an ar-
gument, the legislator may be held strictly accountable for every re-
mark. Debate will thus become stifled and discussions will be
inhibited.
For several reasons, this argument, too, is unconvincing. The pro-
ceedings of the Legislature, as one body, are open for public viewing.7 1
There is no fear expressed at these general sessions that public eyes
preempt meaningful discussion of issues. On the contrary, these meet-
ings are open to the public because the consequences of legislative ac-
tion so affect the public that they have a right to hold their elected
officials accountable. The same reasons for opening sessions of the en-
tire Legislature should equally apply to legislative committees. It
seems clearly in the public interest to know a senator's view on the
issues in order for the public to respond to that representative. The
68. RNU, supra note 4, Rule 3, § 18, at 20.
69. The argument that the news media are representatives of the public can also be
applied to lobbyists. They are paid to advance the interests of certain segments of
the population. If the media attends executive sessions as public representatives,
lobbyists should also attend as representatives. Note, however, that if both media
and lobbyists are included, there is no logical reason to exclude the general
public.
70. One example of this phenomenon was displayed during the 1984 session of the
Legislature. The general consensus of the Legislature, prior to the impeachment
vote against Attorney General Paul Douglas, was that the vote would fail. Sev-
eral attempts to get the vote to the floor failed in closed committee sessions.
When in full view of the Commonwealth depositors, however, the Legislature
impeached Mr. Douglas. In fact, few senators spoke in his favor.
71. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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democratic system of government enables the electorate to make their
collective voices heard through the election process. Closing an execu-
tive session because of what the public might hear or think is clearly
contrary to that goal. 72
Finally, it may be argued that time, space, and convenience suggest
prohibiting public access to executive sessions.73 If members of the
public were allowed to attend, rooms large enough to accomodate
them would be required. Meetings would last longer because of public
input and disruption, and thus would have to be transcribed and put
on public file. However, none of these reasons are sufficiently compel-
ling to close discussions made in executive session to public scrutiny.
Under the Open Meetings Law, the public body can "make and en-
force reasonable rules and regulations regarding the conduct of per-
sons attending . .. its meetings,"74 and "is not required to allow
citizens to speak at each meeting. . . ."75 Therefore, under the stat-
ute members of the public may be lawfully excluded if they unreason-
ably interfere with committee business. Reasonable restrictions may
be established to enable legislators to conduct their business effi-
ciently. Regarding room size, for example, the statute provides that
although a meeting cannot be held in a place "known by the body to be
too small to accomodate the anticipated audience, [n]o public body
shall be deemed in violation of this section if it holds its meeting in its
traditional meeting place."76 Thus, the statute resolves problems of
time, place, and convenience. Also, the expense in transcribing the
proceedings cannot justify excluding the public when the cost is borne
by the public. Finally, even though the committee deliberating on the
1983 amendments was mistakenly told that no other states had open
meetings laws applied to their legislatures, Nebraska is the only state
to manditorily exclude the public yet include the press in discussions
of pending legislation.77 Any argument based on the logistics or oper-
72. See, e.g., Daily Gazette Co. v. Town Bd., 111 Misc. 2d 303, 305, 444 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46
(1981) ("Democracy, like a precious jewel, shines most brilliantly in the light of
an open government.").
73. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
74. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1412 (2) (Cur. Supp. 1984).
75. I.
76. Id at § 84-1412 (4).
77. Floor debates are open in every state by statute, by practice, or by the state consti-
tution. Thirty-two states open legislative committee meetings to the public pur-
suant to the state open meetings laws. Each of these states has certain exceptions
for which committee meetings can be closed. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. REV. STAT.
§ 143.318.1 (1983) (sessions may be closed to prevent personal embarrassment or
when in best interest of the state). Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, and Washington open legislative meetings by
rule. Alabama, Utah, Wisconson, and Wyoming open legislative committee meet-
ings by practice. Two states, Illinois and Montana, open all legislative meetings
by constitution. In Oklahoma, any committee meeting may be closed by majority
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ation of opening executive sessions to the public must be dispelled. If
such procedure works elsewhere, it can also work in Nebraska.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently ruled on the scope of the
section 84-1410 closed meeting provisions in Grein v. Board of Educa-
tion.78 In Grein, the Fremont Board of Education closed a meeting to
the public in order to discuss whether to accept the low bid made on a
school boiler project. The contractor who submitted the bid had made
a $3,000 error in computation, and it was asserted that public disclo-
sure of the error "would needlessly injure the reputation of the con-
tractor."79 When the meeting was reconvened in public, the board
accepted the second lowest bid, without any discussion or explanation.
The court affirmed that the closed meeting violated the Open Meeting
Law, and declared the acceptance of the second lowest bid void.80
The court justified its decision on the ground that the Open Meet-
ings Law is a "statutory commitment to openness in government."81
Because public meetings laws should be broadly interpreted in favor
of public access and narrowly construed when granting closed ses-
sions,8 2 closing a meeting under section 84-1410 requires strong justifi-
cation. The "slight discomfort, if any, experienced by a low bidder in
the area of public lettings is far outweighed by the public policy favor-
ing openness in the meetings of the public body."83 The court con-
cluded that a public body's good intentions are not sufficient to close a
public meeting, and that issues impacting on the "pocketbooks and
wallets" of the public must be deliberated in public.8 4
Issues discussed in executive sessions of legislative committees im-
vote. Common Cause, State Open Meetings Laws (July 1982) (compilation avail-
able from Common Cause, 2030 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
Nebraska is the only state with a rule that automatically eliminates the public
from committee meetings, and it is the only state to differentiate between media
and public for access to meetings of governmental bodies. In several states, in-
cluding South Dakota, press members are allowed access to party caucuses while
the public is excluded. However, such meetings are not held to conduct public
business, and do not come within the purpose of the Open Meetings Law. Tele-
phone interview with the Asst. Clerk of the S.D. Leg. (Apr. 2, 1984). See also
Hearings on LB 43, supra note 22, at 22: "I should tell you, I think [in] no state
does it apply to the Legislature. I would be glad to check that but I don't think
that they do. Normally, legislatures govern themselves with their rules commit-
tee." (statement of Alan Peterson, counsel and lobbyist for Media of Nebraska).
78. 216 Neb. 158, 343 N.W.2d 718 (1984).
79. 1& at 160, 343 N.W.2d at 721.
80. Id. at 166, 343 N.W.2d at 725.
81. Id at 163, 343 N.W.2d at 722 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 164, 343 N.W.2d at 723. See aso Rice v. Union City Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J.
Super. 64, 70, 382 A.2d 386, 388 (1977) (follow strict adherence to the letter of the
law); Daily Gazette Co. v. Town Bd., 111 Misc. 2d 303, 304, 444 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46
(1981) (exceptions to open meetings law are few and narrowly construed).
83. Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 166, 343 N.W.2d 718, 724 (1984).
84. Id at 165, 167, 343 N.W.2d at 723.
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pact on the people of Nebraska, not only in the wallet or pocketbook,
but in everyday life as well. Decisions made by the Legislature govern
nearly every facet of life in some form or another. To suggest that
legislative committee decisions are not in the public interest is ludi-
crous. The scale weighs heavily in favor of open executive sessions
because of the public's need to be aware of the deliberations and deci-
sions that go into the making of public policy. Granted, there are ar-
guments against public access to executive sessions, but when in
doubt, "bear in mind the policy of openness promoted by the Public
Meetings Laws and opt for a meeting in the presence of the public."8 5
III. RULE 3, SECTION 15 VIOLATES THE FIRST AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
The guarantees of the first amendment are applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 86 The first amendment is to be
given a broad interpretation7 to insure that the public has access to a
marketplace of ideas. Because first amendment principles must be ap-
plied "in light of the characteristics of the . . .environment,"88 its
freedoms are not absolute.89 However, "It]he principle of the freedom
of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self govern-
ment."90 Only through the free exchange and debate of ideas will the
government remain responsive to the desire of its people.
85. Id. at 168, 343 N.W.2d at 724.
86. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
87. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) ("[W]e have long eschewed any 'nar-
row, literal conception' of the [First] Amendment's terms .... ); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946) (freedom of discussion should be given wide
range); Thomas v. Collins 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (allow widest range for discus-
sion and narrowest room for restriction).
88. Pell v. Procunier 417 U.S. 817, 837 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
89. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 758 (1976) (commercial speech not given same first amendment status);
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting disruptive
noises near schools not unconstitutional); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957) (obscenity not constitutionally protected); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315, 320 (1951) (speech presenting a clear danger of disorder not protected); Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (sound trucks not protected); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("fighting words" not constitutionally
protected).
90. A. MIEKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 26 (1948), quoted in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 862-63 n.8 (1974).
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A. The First Amendment Secures a Right of Access to Important
Government Business
Since Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,91 the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held that the first amendment guar-
antees a right of access to "matters relating to the functioning of gov-
ernment."92 In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that criminal
trials must be open to the public, absent overriding articulated inter-
ests.93 This right of access is not stated explicitly in the Constitution.
However, because criminal trials have been historically open to the
press and the public, that "tradition of accessibility implies the
favorable judgment of experience." 94
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court again addressed
the right-to-access issue. In Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court,95 a
Massachusetts statute providing for exclusion of the general public
from trials involving minor sex victims was held unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion reasoned that the first amendment
serves to ensure the continuation of the republican system of govern-
ment through individual participation and contribution.96 The Court
declared: "Thus to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a
right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitution-
ally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an informed
one."9 7 In a footnote, the majority negated the need to identify a his-
torical precedent for a particular rule, stating that the right to access
depends not on history "but rather on the state interests assertedly
supporting the restriction."9 8 Because this right of access is not abso-
lute, the Court announced a two-part test to determine when access to
criminal trials can be denied: first, denial must be predicated on a
91. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
92. I& at 575. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct:, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
There were earlier cases in which.the Supreme Court denied the press any
right of access or right to receive information about prisons or jails beyond that of
the general public. It is not clear whether these cases stand for the proposition
that the public generally has no right of access to such institutions. See, e.g.,
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (first amendment does not guarantee a
right of access to all sources of information within government control); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
93. 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
94. Id- at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
95. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
96. Id at 605. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575
(1980) ("[T]he first amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees [of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press]"). See also text accompanying note 91.
97. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982) (emphasis
added).
98. Id. at 605 n.13.
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
compelling governmental interest; and second, it must be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.99
Finally, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,10 0 the Court
held that voir dire proceedings in a rape and murder trial could not be
constitutionally closed to the public when no alternatives to closure
were considered and no explanation was given.' 0 ' The Court reiter-
ated the Globe Newspaper test and concluded that the practices of the
Superior Court of California failed to pass the test.102 However, reli-
ance was once again placed on historical precedent.os
Justice Stevens concurred to state specifically that the right to ac-
cess is found in the first amendment.104 Quoting Richmond Newspa-
pers, Globe Newspaper, and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,105 he
concluded: "It follows that a claim to access cannot succeed unless
access makes a positive contribution to this process of self-govern-
ance .... Surely such proceedings should not be hidden from public
view."' 06
The caselaw unmistakeably holds that the first amendment guar-
antees a right of access to matters relating to the process or function-
ing of government. It is unclear, however, whether historical
precedent must be shown to establish a right of access. 07 Therefore,
to determine whether this right of access applies to Nebraska legisla-
tive proceedings, certain questions are raised: (1) has historical prece-
dent been established allowing governmental bodies to be open to the
public?; (2) does the policy espoused by the Supreme Court apply to
99. Id. at 606-07. It should be noted that this test was applied in the context of a
criminal trial, and was applied because the "State attempt[ed] to deny the right of
access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information." Id at 606. The
trial court in Globe Newspaper had a good reason for closing the trial: to protect
the minor sex victim from trauma and embarrassment. The Court held that this
alone was not sufficient to mandate exclusion of the public even though it was a
"compelling" reason. 1d at 607.
100. 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
101. Id at 824. The trial court did not reveal why the voir dire was not closed only for
solicitation of sensitive information. Id at 824-25.
102. Chief Justice Burger spoke for the majority in Press-Enterprise. He articulated
the test of Globe Newspaper as the standard for closure. However, in his previous
dissenting opinion in Globe Newspaper, the Chief Justice stated that he felt the
two-part test was too rigid. Instead, he advocated that the restrictions need only
be reasonable and override the limited and incidental effects on first amendment
rights. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 615-16 (1982) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice based this position on the fact that there was
no historical precedent for opening trials involving the minor victims of sexual
assaults and because of the compelling interests involved in the case. Id- at 614-
16.
103. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819, 823 (1984).
104. Id at 827.
105. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
106. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819, 828-29 (1984).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 95-104.
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all governmental proceedings?; and (3) does Rule 3, section 15 meet
the Globe Newspaper test?
1. Historical Precedent Establishes a General Right of the
Public to Attend Meetings of Governmental Bodies
Although it is true that under English common law there was no
public right to attend meetings of governmental bodies, in the United
States such a public right of access has historically been maintained. 0 8
English Parliament was closed because "[t]o print or publish the
speeches of gentlemen in this House looks very like making them ac-
countable without doors for what they say within."10 9 However,
American democracy is premised upon a system of government by the
people, with checks and balances. The ideal cannot succeed without
public access to, and scrutiny of, government meetings and govern-
ment records. As James Madison noted, "[a] popular government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Pro-
logue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both."11o Thus, gatherings of
legislative bodies, for the most part, have been open in the United
States."'1 The Nebraska Constitution also reinforces this observation
by requiring that meetings of the Legislature be open.112
2. The Need for Open Government Mandates that the Public
Should have Access to Legislative Committee Meetings
While the proceedings of a legislature as one body have generally
been open, the same has not always been true for legislative commit-
tees.113 Because of conflicting language in Globe Newspaper and
108. H. LINDE & G. BuNN, LEGIsLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 393 (1976).
109. Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HARv.
L. REV. 1199, 1203 (1962) (quoting T. TAsWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 588 (11th ed. 1960)).
110. H. LINDE & G. BuNN, supra note 109, at 394 (1976) (quoting letter to W.T. Barby,
Aug. 4, 1822).
111. Id The fact that not all of the proceedings of Congress have been public can be
analogized to the fact that not all of the proceedings of the judiciary have been
historically public. Bench conferences have not been open to the public, nor have
jury deliberations. Congress has closed its proceedings when they related to sen-
sitive or security information.
112. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11. See supra text accompanying note 40. Cf. Pennsylvania
v. Contakos, 499 Pa. 340, 453 A.2d 578 (1982) (reversible error to exclude public
and admit press because state constitution provides that "all courts shall be
open").
It should be noted that there is an argument that closing legislative committee
meetings is violative of the Nebraska Constitution, which requires that all meet-
ings of the Legislature shall be open. A discussion of that argument is beyond the
scope of this Article.
113. See H. LINDE & G. BuNN, supra note 109, at 393. See also, Note, supra note 109, at
1199 (open meetings laws mandating open government developed rapidly during
the 1950's and early 1960's).
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Press-Enterprise, it is unclear whether historical precedent is a re-
quirement for open proceedings.114 However, the Court has consist-
ently justified the first amendment right of access on the "common
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relat-
ing to the functioning of government."115 As the Court concluded in
Globe Newspaper, openness of criminal trials encourages an appear-
ance of fairness and allows the populace to participate in, and act as a
check on, the system," an essential component in our structure of self-
government."116
Although a majority of the Court has never expressly limited this
right of access to criminal trials,117 in earlier cases it held that there is
no constitutional right of access to prisons and jails.118 Quoting Jus-
tice Stewart, the Court in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,119 stated that the
constitution "is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official
Secrets Act." 20 These earlier "prison access" cases can be distin-
guished on several bases.
Houchins, a plurality opinion, held that members of the news me-
dia have no constitutional right of access to county jails beyond that of
the general phblic.121 Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment,
specifically held open the issue of whether denying access to the pub-
lic violated the first amendment. 12 2 Furthermore, a prison or jail is
not a constitutionally established system of elected officials. The
prison system does not make laws and is generally not accountable
directly to the electorate through the voting process. Thus, closing
prisons to the public is not nearly the infringement on the public's
need to know as is closing the legislative process.123
The legislative closed meetings issue is more closely analogous to
the "open court" cases.'24 Criminal trials must be public in order to
hold the system accountable.12 5 The public's need for government in-
formation is likewise essential to its ability to hold government offi-
cials accountable, and to intelligently select representatives. People
114. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
115. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (emphasis
added).
116. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (emphasis added).
117. But see id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I interpret neither Richmond
Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any implications outside the
context of criminal trials.").
118. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
119. 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975)).
121. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
122. Id. 18-19. See supra note 93.
123. In addition, prisons must be distinquished on the basis of security and inmate
privacy. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 (1978).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 95-106.
125. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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have a right to know how and why their money is being spent, and
how their country is being run.32 6 Open legislative committee meet-
ings provide a "positive contribution to this process of self govern-
ance." 12 7 Conversely, "[s]ecrecy is the most convenient means of
keeping power out of the hands of the people. Public bodies that
make decisions behind closed doors breed suspicion that private inter-
ests are being served."1 28
Finally, although there is an inherent conflict in opening criminal
trials to the public because such access could jeopardize the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial,1 2 9 criminal trials must nev-
ertheless be open to the public even when the defendant's request for
closure is unopposed.so A legislative committee meeting, on the
other hand, can be open and accessible to the public without fear of
violating other constitutionally protected rights.131 If trials must be
open, even when the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial is at stake,
it surely follows that a legislative committee meeting must also be
open.
3. Rule 3, Section 15 Does Not Meet the Globe Newspaper Test
Even if the historical precedent of open legislatures in general does
not apply to committee meetings, these meetings must nevertheless be
open because of the general policy favoring a right of access to govern-
ment proceedings. Nebraska Unicameral Rule 3, section 15 must
therefore pass the two-prong Globe Newspaper test in order to consti-
tutionally deny public access. That is, it must involve a compelling
governmental interest that is narrowly tailored. 3 2
First, of the reasons that might justify public exclusion from legis-
lative committee meetings-public apathy, lobby pressure, conven-
ience, lack of public pressure, and press representation 13 3 -none are
126. See supra note 63.
127. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
128. Statement of Principles, Common Cause (available from Common Cause, 2030 M
Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
129. See Garnett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-94 (1979) (no right of access to pre-
trial proceedings when parties to litigation have agreed to closure to protect de-
fendant's fair trial rights); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976)
("tensions develop between the right of the accused to trial by an impartial jury
and the rights guaranteed others by the First amendment").
130. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
131. An argument that privacy rights are violated might be made. See, e.g., Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
462 (1958) (invalid disclosure of membership lists)). However, it is doubtful that
such an argument would succeed. Public officials choose, when they run for
elected office, to relinquish some privacy.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 64-73.
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sufficiently compelling to justify closing meetings from public scru-
tiny. This is especially clear when compared to the fact that a criminal
trial cannot be closed even for the "compelling" reason of protecting a
minor.1 34 The Legislature's desire to conduct secret meetings is surely
not a sufficient and compelling reason to mandate public exclusion.
Furthermore, press access, based on a theory of press representation,
is not the functional constitutional equivalent of public access. It is
firmly established that the press's right of access is no greater than the
public's. 135 Thus, Rule 3, section 15 fails the "compelling interest"
prong of the Globe Newspaper test.
Second, the rule is overbroad. Concededly, the right to access is
not absolute,13s and reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
may be imposed.137 However, even if some compelling governmental
need for closure exists, the committee cannot exclude the public from
every session without determining the necessity of such action. Before
closure will be allowed, alternatives must be tried to satisfy first
amendment demands.13 8 As the Court noted in Globe Newspaper, clo-
sure must be determined on a case-by-case basis,139 because a "pre-
sumption of openness inheres in. . . our system of justice."14o So, too,
must a presumption of openness exist in our system of democratic gov-
ernment. If the Legislature is truly concerned about interruptions
and efficient meetings, alternative and less drastic means can be estab-
134. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
135. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
136. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819, 829 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (public right of access
is not unlimited); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980)
(the right of access can be overcome by overriding interests articulated in the
findings); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (not every decrease in data flow
encompasses first amendment rights).
137. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 104 S. Ct. 819, 829 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (noting that the privacy interests of jurors may provide a basis for
some limitation on the public's access to voir dire); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (student conduct that materially disrupts classwork,
involves disorder, or invades the rights of others-whether from time, place, or
type of behavior-is not immunized by constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (striking broad-
sweeping ordinance prohibiting distribution of any literature without written
permission).
138. A mandatory closure of access to information is suspect. See Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) ("[I]t is clear that the circumstances of
the particular case may affect the significance of the interest.").
139. Id. The Court noted that: "Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspa-
pers suggested that individualized determinations are always required before the
right of access may be denied .... Id. at n.20 (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 610 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 at 573
(1980) (plurality opinion).
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lished. For example, the public might observe executive sessions from
a separate room via video camera.141 Those persons disrupting the ses-
sion could be excluded or the press could be guaranteed priority seat-
ing.142 If unreasonable interference becomes a problem, the solution
should be "not to restrict the openness of the [meeting] to the public,
but instead to prescribe rules for the conduct of those attending."143
Rule 3, section 15 fails to satisfy the second prong of the Globe News-
paper test because it is not narrowly tailored to a government interest.
B. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Guarantees First Amendment Freedoms for all Citizens
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to
any person in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ... ."144
Generally, classifications created by the government must have some
rational basis.145 However, when a classification burdens a fundamen-
tal right, that classification is subject to strict analysis in order to pre-
serve the value of equal treatment. 4 6 First amendment guarantees
have long been established as fundamental rights.147 The state may
abridge these rights (1) by the direct suppression of ideas or informa-
tion; or (2) by incidental or indirect restriction on the flow of
information.148
1. Denial of Public Access to Legislative Committee Meetings
Expressly Restricts the Public's Right of Access
If a government classification expressly suppresses first amend-
ment freedoms, the classification is constitutional only if it can with-
stand strict scrutiny: the burden must further a compelling state
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to that goal.'49 On its face,
Rule 3, section 15 classifies the press as a special group with greater
141. This method of access was successfully utilized during the recent removal pro-
ceedings against Attorney General Paul Douglas before the Nebraska Supreme
Court. However, even this method may pose constitutional problems if the press
is allowed direct access, but the public is only given video-camera access.
142. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) ("While
media representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public, they often are
provided special seating and priority of entry so that they may report . .
143. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
146. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 16-6. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) ("[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scru-
tiny of a legislation classification ... when the classification impermissibly inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental right. .. ").
147. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
148. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 12-20.
149. This is the same test enunciated in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S.
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access to information. The Rule thereby restricts the first amendment
freedoms of persons not members of that special group. The Nebraska
Legislature must, therefore, demonstrate that there is a compelling
reason for this classification,150 and also show that the classification is
tailored to avoid any unnecessary infringement on first amendment
freedoms. As discussed above, neither of these burdens can be met.151
If the Legislature excludes the public from committee meetings be-
cause it wishes to keep the content of those meetings secret, the classi-
fication does not serve that purpose. Classifying members of the
public into press and non-press categories, in essence, circumvents the
closed meeting objective. Although committee members are at liberty
to discuss issues without fear of immediate constituent or lobby reac-
tion, press persons may attend committee meetings and report what
they saw and heard to non-press persons. Thus, the content of the
meetings is not kept confidential, rendering the rule impotent.
If the Legislature is not concerned with secrecy, it may hope that
through partial public access committee meeting information will
eventually reach the rest of the public. However, the classification re-
mains impermissible because press access takes away public access and
does not ensure any public dissemination.152 Executive sessions are
not transcribed for public record and the press has no duty to report
on the proceedings.153 Thus, non-press persons have no consistent or
complete access to discussions in executive session.15 4
596, 607 (1982) (indicating that the right of access is a fundamental right). See
also L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 12-8.
150. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(town failed to establish that ordinance banning "for sale" signs was necessary);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (state failed to justify need for restricting flow of drug price
information).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44.
152. The press does not have a duty to report and, as such, the public may not receive
any information on a topic discussed in executive session. Although it is true that
the public would still not have that information if it chose not to attend, the right
to the information and the potential to receive it would still exist. See infra text
accompanying notes 165-91.
153. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
154. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 12-19. In essence, without information about the
legislative process, citizens cannot effectively bring about the political and social
changes they desire. Such restrictions tend to close the spectrum of information
from which individuals may draw. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (established right to possess pornographic material in one's home); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (cannot prohibit teaching of German).
Sen. Chambers stated in the committee hearing for LB 43:
[T]he news media which is often dishonest, distorting, picks and chooses
what it's going to report, will often send an unlettered reporter to cover
a story and as a result through ignorance, inattentiveness, totally misrep-
resents to the public what has happened and that is the public's only
information. Certain public officials receive favored treatment by the
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Furthermore, media-only access is bound to result in censorship of
ideas and information.15 5 Only that information the news media con-
siders newsworthy will be communicated to the general public. Be-
cause not all executive session business is of interest to enough of a
news medium's audience, only "popular" issues will be broadcast or
published.156 Even assuming that the public will eventually receive
some information, there is still no logical reason to exclude the public
from committee meetings-unless the Legislature knows that the
press will not report or only selectively report. 57 If the public will
learn what happens in executive session, why bother to exclude them?
In any case, the classification must fail because information to which
the non-press public has a right is being selectively filtered by the
media.
2. Denial of Public Access Also Places an Incidental Burden on
First Amendment Liberties
If the government's classification system only incidentally restricts
free speech and expression while pursuing other legitimate goals, the
government must show that the regulatory interests outweigh the val-
ues of freedom of expression.1 58 This test was articulated in
Procunier v. Martinez, 59 in which the Court held that censorship of
inmate correspondence was unconstitutional under the first amend-
ment. Regulatory restrictions must "further an important or substan-
tial interest unrelated to the suppression of expression .... [and] the
media. They are protected in their wrong. They are shielded and cov-
ered for, then the news media which has the mobbing instinct will take
off like a pack of hounds behind a wounded fox if it's somebody they
don't like, so that's the evil....
O " bkay, now if the public body has its meetings closed and determines
what the public will know, then that body is effectively controlling the
flow of information to the public and deciding what they would hear and
no (inaudible) goes on....
S.... On the other hand, if the news media, for whatever reason, decides
that some things ought to be reported and others not, then they in effect,
when there are certain type of meetings where the media can go but the
public can't, they control the flow of information....
Hearings on LB 43, supra note 22, at 15, 23.
155. But cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973) ("public trustee" broadcasting does not guarantee right of access be-
cause editors have the right to select what will be broadcast).
156. The media is governed by ratings and subscriptions. If the news becomes boring
or redundant-that is, not enough "sexy" journalism-the audience will dwindle.
Therefore, the business of disseminating news cannot be expected to cover all
issues.
157. See supra note 155 and- accompanying text.
158. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 12-2.
159. 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
limitation must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the pro-
tection of the particular governmental interest involved."160
The classification of news personnel may further a governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of first amendment freedoms,
since closed committee meetings may be convenient, yet still allow
some public dissemination. However, it is far from clear that this in-
terest is substantial. Even if closed executive sessions do not prevent
lobbyists or the general public from receiving information or exerting
pressure, administrative ease alone is an insubstantial excuse to keep
the public from the information that it elected the legislators to dis-
cuss.1 61 Weighing the convenience of uninterrupted meetings against
the public's need to know and right to view the workings of its Legisla-
ture, the balance tips in favor of the public. Continued loyalty and
trust in the legislative process is imperative, and granting the press a
right to access over the general public promotes distrust of the govern-
ment. Clearly, inconvenience, when compared to the value of public
access, cannot be considered a substantial reason for closure.
Even assuming that committee convenience is a substantial inter-
est, the classification is again more restrictive than necessary to pro-
tect that interest. To keep meetings orderly, the Legislature may
impose reasonable time, place, and manner requirements on the pub-
lic, without eliminating access altogether.162 Unless these measures
are impossible, the classification system imposed by Rule 3, section 15
is broader than necessary.163
3. The "Press" Has No Constitutional Right to Act as a Public
Representative so as to Exclude the Public from
Governmental Proceedings
Although the right to gather news "is not without its first amend-
ment protections,"164 the institutionalized press has no greater right of
access under the first amendment than the general public. The
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the corollary issues of
whether the public and the news media must be provided the same
160. Id. at 413. This test is comparable to the test espoused by Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion in Globe Newspaper. See supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
161. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (administrative ease not enough to discrimi-
nate on basis of gender under a "middle-tier" analysis).
162. See supra notes 73-77 & 140-44 and accompanying text.
163. See supra text accompanying note 161.
164. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). This statement does not imply that
the first amendment provides the institutionalized media with any rights greater
than the general public. In Branzburg the court held that the first amendment
does not grant newspersons the right to withhold information from federal grand
juries. In that context, the court announced simply that the right to gather infor-
mation was important.
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rights of access, or whether the press clause of the first amendment
provides the news media with a power to act as agent of the public.1 65
Yet, dicta in several cases lead to the conclusion that press and public
must receive equal treatment.166
In his concurring opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti,67
Chief Justice Burger provided an extensive and thoughtful critique of
the press clause. In Bellotti, the majority held that the first amend-
ment protects corporate discussions and dissemination of ideas or in-
formation.168 Chief Justice Burger stated that this protection
extended to all corporations, not simply media corporations, for two
reasons.169 First, the press clause does not create a special constitu-
tional privilege for the institutionalized press. 170 In fact, the freedom
of speech and freedom of press were historically interchangeable
terms.171 This does not suggest that the press clause is redundant:
"The speech clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of
the liberty to express ideas and beliefs, while the press clause focuses
specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and 'com-
prehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of informa-
tion and opinion.' "172
Chief Justice Burger also found an inherent difficulty in defining
165. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(the rights inherent under the press clause "[have] not yet been squarely re-
solved"). See also id. at 798 n.3.
166. Obviously opinions differ. However, Supreme Court dictum weighs heavily to-
ward press clause rights for all. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555,577 n.12 (1980) ('That the right to attend may be exercised by people
less frequently today when information as to trial generally reaches them by way
of print and electronic media in no way alters the basic right."); Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1978) ("media personnel [may not be] the best qual-
ified persons for the task of discovering malfeasance in public institutions.");
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 857 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("The guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of every citi-
zen; they do not create special privileges for particular groups or individuals.").
But see, e.g., Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("the press serves
to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of
public scrutiny upon the administration of justice"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 219 (1966) ("the press [is] a constitutionally chosen means for keeping offi-
cials elected by the people responsible").
167. 435 U.S. 765, 795-802 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
168. Bellotti overturned a Massachusetts statute forbidding expenditures by banks
and business corporations for the purposes of influencing votes on referendum
proposals under the first and fourteenth amendments.
169. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-98 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
170. Id at 798.
171. Id. at 799. See also Scott v. City Clerk, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1164, 1165 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1982) (press and public used interchangeably, therefore press cannot be
allowed if public excluded); Pennsylvania v. Contakos, 499 Pa. 340, 348, 453 A.2d
578, 582 (1982) ("Neither may be excluded because the other is present.").
172. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
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who comprises the "press" for purposes of the press clause.173 The
Court has plainly stated that freedom of the press embraces all forms
of dissemination. 74 Any attempt to limit the right to disseminate to
only those powerful or rich enough to reach institutional news media
status 7 5 reduces the press clause to a licensing system-something
the first amendment was enacted to prevent. 76 Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that the first amendment, including the press clause, be-
longs to all citizens, not simply to an established class or group. 77
Chief Justice Burger's analysis is appropriately applied to closed
committee meetings. Granting press access to executive sessions as
the public representative implies that the press has a duty to provide
to the public the content of those sessions. 78 Unless this duty is ful-
filled, the representative label is meaningless. Once a duty is imposed,
governmental enforcement of that duty follows. The Supreme Court
has consistently found that this type of control is an infringement on
the media's right to decide what to publish.179 In Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo,18 0 the Court held that the public has no right to
dictate to the newspaper press: "[N]o 'government agency-local,
state, or federal--can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print
and what it cannot.' 181- Thus, unless the Legislature requires disclo-
sure of the entire executive session, or at least fair portions on each
side, 8 2 the public is denied access. The people elected their govern-
173. Id. at 801.
174. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) ("liberty of the press is the
right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper... just as much as of the
large metropolitan publisher"); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, (1938)
(freedom of the press "embraces pamphlets and leaflets"). Cf. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931) (freedom of the press allows every free man the right
to speak before the public).
175. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-54 (1974), in
which the Court noted that monopoly of newspaper groups and chains is a grow-
ing concern. See also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 99 (1973) ("system [is] heavily weighted in favor of the finan-
cially affluent, or those with access to wealth").
176. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938).
177. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring),
quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) ("[Ihe purpose of the
constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect
all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it."
(Frankfurther, J., concurring)).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
179. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also infra text accompanying
notes 185-87.
180. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
181. I& at 255-56 (quoting Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 400 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
182. Of course there is a problem of determining what are fair portions and what are
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ment officials to act as public servants. This representative system
does not vest those officials with the right to decide what information
is good and what is not good for the people to receive. This principle is
even stronger when applied to the news media because there is no
election process, no method of "voting out" a news source that fails to
properly and adequately "represent."83
Defining members of the news media for purposes of the rule again
resurrects the licensing system spectre. 8 4 Classfications among the
various types of news media may be upheld as rational.18 5 However,
denying certain members of the public the right to disseminate infor-
mation, by classifying them as "non-media," may not be constitutional.
The press' right of dissemination inures "not only [to] newspapers,
books, and magazines, but also [to] humble leaflets and circulars."18 6
Thus, each individual has the right to attend executive sessions if for
no other reason than to assimilate and disseminate this information
through a handwritten leaflet.187 Any system that eliminates this
right "strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by
subjecting it to license and censorship .... ,"18
Finally, press representation imposes a constitutionally impermis-
sible filter on publicly available information by investing in a single
group the discretion to open or close important channels of communi-
cation. The first amendment prohibits "limiting the stock of informa-
tion from which members of the public may draw."18 9 A decision by
the press alone regarding what information the public should receive
unreasonably restricts the public's right to access. Press reporting,
like the transcript of a judicial proceeding, "is no substitute for public
presence."190 Granting the press rights under the press clause while
denying these same rights to others, even to facilitate information dis-
the sides. A determination of this type comes very close to government control of
the press, or censorship.
183. There is "consumer pressure" that can be used on news institutions. However,
unless the public has some access to information, they will not know what infor-
mation they are being denied.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
185. See Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d 448,88 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 982 (1971).
186. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). See also supra note 181.
187. Of course, the right to disseminate information must be equal to the right to ac-
cess information. If not, the right of dissemination, which has been zealously pro-
tected by the Court, would disappear. There must be sources of information,
uncensored and unfiltered, to publish.
188. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
189. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
190. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597 n.22 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring). "Indeed, to the extent that publicity serves as a check upon trial
officials, '[r]ecordation .... would be found to operate rather as cloa[k] than
chec[k]; as cloa[k] in reality, as chec[k] only in appearance."' Id. (quoting 1 J.
BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
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semination, cannot be condoned under the first amendment when the
practice actually restricts the flow of information.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The first amendment is the cornerstone of all constitutional free-
doms,191 without which tyranny and government control prevail. The
freedoms ennunciated by the Supreme Court as emanating from the
first amendment must be ensured complete protection. Thus, the Ne-
braska Legislature must eliminate the distinction between press and
public in its legislative rules. This can be done in two ways: (1) deny-
ing access to all; or (2) providing access to all.
First, denying access to all solves some of the problems inherent in
Rule 3, section 15. Press representation problems of licensing and con-
trol are avoided. In addition, if total access is denied, constituent pres-
sure might evolve to open the process. The democratic system of
government provides for this type of check and balance, so that if
those elected to do the public's bidding do not so perform, they can be
replaced at the next election.
By far, the better approach is to open executive sessions to all the
public. It is incongruous to elect individuals to act as public represent-
atives only to have those servants "hide" the process of the govern-
ment from their constituents. All of the public has the right as well as
a need to know, and it would seem to be the Legislature's duty to open
its meetings to accomplish this purpose.
Although press representation is no assurance of public access, in-
clusion of the general public in legislative committee executive ses-
sions does not mean that the public must be allowed to attend every
gathering of news personnel. Gathering and dissemination of news
has evolved into a business enterprise. As such, the public should not
be allowed to interfere with the "business" of gathering news. Mem-
bers of the media can attend press conferences, take private inter-
views, or chase stories without fear of public intrusion. However,
when the government is acting in its decisionmaking capacity, formu-
lating policy, and taking votes that affect the general public, the press
cannot be the sole recipient of that information under the guarantees
of the first amendment.
Kim M. Robak, '85
191. For an explanation of the broad and narrow views of the first amendment, see L.
TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 12-1. See also Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Re-
dundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 640-41
(1970). But see Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975).
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